(* CDE004. Four enrolled identities, unbounded concurrent sessions, ideal primitives. *) type identity. type skl. type pkl. type sigl. type sks. type pks. type sigs. type skm. type pkm. type ctm. type skh. type pkh. type cth. type shared. type key. type mac. fun vkL(skl):pkl. fun signL(bitstring,skl):sigl. reduc forall m:bitstring,k:skl; verifyL(signL(m,k),vkL(k))=m. reduc forall m:bitstring,k:skl; messageL(signL(m,k))=m. fun vkS(sks):pks. fun signS(bitstring,sks):sigs. reduc forall m:bitstring,k:sks; verifyS(signS(m,k),vkS(k))=m. reduc forall m:bitstring,k:sks; messageS(signS(m,k))=m. fun pkM(skm):pkm. fun encM(pkm,bitstring):ctm. fun secM(pkm,bitstring):shared. reduc forall sk:skm,coins:bitstring; decM(encM(pkM(sk),coins),sk)=secM(pkM(sk),coins). fun pkH(skh):pkh. fun encH(pkh,bitstring):cth. fun secH(pkh,bitstring):shared. reduc forall sk:skh,coins:bitstring; decH(encH(pkH(sk),coins),sk)=secH(pkH(sk),coins). fun robust(shared,shared,ctm,cth,pkm,pkh,bitstring):key. fun derive(key,bitstring):key. fun hmac(key,bitstring):mac. fun aead(bitstring,key,bitstring,bitstring):bitstring. reduc forall m:bitstring,k:key,n:bitstring,ad:bitstring; open(aead(m,k,n,ad),k,n,ad)=m. table directory(identity,pkl,pks). free net:channel. free alice,bob,carol,mallory:identity. free protocol,version,dualPolicy,oldPolicy,oldVersion:bitstring. free requestTag,offerTag,responseTag,receiptTag,contextTag,confirmA,confirmB,dataA,dataB:bitstring. free payload:bitstring [private]. event Registered(identity,pkl,pks). event KeyUsed(identity,pkl,pks). event BeginA(identity,identity,bitstring,key). event BeginB(identity,identity,bitstring,key). event AcceptA(identity,identity,bitstring,key). event AcceptB(identity,identity,bitstring,key). event SessionKey(key). event SuiteAccepted(bitstring,bitstring,bitstring). query attacker(payload). query k:key; event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k) ==> false. query a:identity,b:identity,t:bitstring,k:key; inj-event(AcceptB(a,b,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a,b,t,k)). query a:identity,b:identity,t:bitstring,k:key; inj-event(AcceptA(a,b,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a,b,t,k)). query a:identity,b:identity,t:bitstring,k:key; event(AcceptA(a,b,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a,b,t,k)). query a:identity,l:pkl,s:pks; event(KeyUsed(a,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a,l,s)). query p:bitstring,v:bitstring,policy:bitstring; event(SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy)) ==> (p=protocol && v=version && policy=dualPolicy). query a:identity,b:identity,t:bitstring,k:key; event(AcceptA(a,b,t,k)) ==> false. let Initiator(a:identity,la:skl,sa:sks,b:identity) = get directory(=b,lb:pkl,sb:pks) in event KeyUsed(b,lb,sb); new na:bitstring; out(net,(requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na)); in(net,(off:bitstring,proofL:sigl,proofS:sigs)); let (tag:bitstring,p:bitstring,v:bitstring,policy:bitstring,aa:identity,bb:identity,nn:bitstring,sid:bitstring,nb:bitstring,pm:pkm,ph:pkh)=verifyL(proofL,lb) in let hashOffer=verifyS(proofS,sb) in if tag=offerTag && p=protocol && v=version && policy=dualPolicy && aa=a && bb=b && nn=na then if off=(tag,p,v,policy,aa,bb,nn,sid,nb,pm,ph) && hashOffer=off then new rm:bitstring; new rh:bitstring; let cm=encM(pm,rm) in let ch=encH(ph,rh) in let context=(contextTag,p,v,policy,a,b,na,sid,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in let root=robust(secM(pm,rm),secH(ph,rh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in event BeginA(a,b,context,root); out(net,(responseTag,sid,cm,ch,signL(context,la),signS(context,sa),hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)))); in(net,(=receiptTag,=sid,confirmation:mac)); if confirmation=hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context)) then event AcceptA(a,b,context,root); event SessionKey(root); event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); event SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy); new nonce:bitstring; out(net,(nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataA),nonce,context))). let Responder(b:identity,lb:skl,sb:sks) = in(net,(=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a:identity,=b,na:bitstring)); get directory(=a,la:pkl,sa:pks) in event KeyUsed(a,la,sa); new sid:bitstring; new nb:bitstring; new km:skm; new kh:skh; let pm=pkM(km) in let ph=pkH(kh) in let offer=(offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na,sid,nb,pm,ph) in out(net,(offer,signL(offer,lb),signS(offer,sb))); in(net,(=responseTag,=sid,cm:ctm,ch:cth,proofL:sigl,proofS:sigs,confirmation:mac)); let context=(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na,sid,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in let lMessage=verifyL(proofL,la) in let sMessage=verifyS(proofS,sa) in if lMessage=context && sMessage=context then let root=robust(decM(cm,km),decH(ch,kh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in if confirmation=hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)) then if a=alice || a=carol then ( event BeginB(a,b,context,root); event AcceptB(a,b,context,root); event SessionKey(root); event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy); out(net,(receiptTag,sid,hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context)))); new nonce:bitstring; out(net,(nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataB),nonce,context))) ) else out(net,(receiptTag,sid,hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context)))). process new la:skl; new sa:sks; new lb:skl; new sb:sks; new lc:skl; new sc:sks; new lm:skl; new sm:sks; insert directory(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); event Registered(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); insert directory(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); event Registered(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); insert directory(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); event Registered(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); out(net,(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa),bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb),carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc))); insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); out(net,(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm),lm,sm)); ((!Initiator(alice,la,sa,bob)) | (!Initiator(carol,lc,sc,bob)) | (!Responder(bob,lb,sb)) )