File "CDE-004-public_key_substitution_attempt.txt", line 70, characters 102-104: Warning: identifier sid rebound. File "CDE-004-public_key_substitution_attempt.txt", line 94, characters 9-11: Warning: identifier sid rebound. File "CDE-004-public_key_substitution_attempt.txt", line 122, characters 65-67: Warning: identifier sid rebound. Process 0 (that is, the initial process): {1}new la: skl; {2}new sa: sks; {3}new lb: skl; {4}new sb: sks; {5}new lc: skl; {6}new sc: sks; {7}new lm: skl; {8}new sm: sks; {9}insert directory(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {10}event Registered(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {11}insert directory(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {12}event Registered(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {13}insert directory(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {14}event Registered(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {15}out(net, (alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa),bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb),carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc))); {16}insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {17}event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {18}out(net, (mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm),lm,sm)); ( {19}! {20}let a: identity = alice in {21}let la_1: skl = la in {22}let sa_1: sks = sa in {23}let b: identity = bob in {49}get directory(=b,lb_1: pkl,sb_1: pks) in {24}event KeyUsed(b,lb_1,sb_1); {25}new na: bitstring; {26}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na)); {27}in(net, (off: bitstring,proofL: sigl,proofS: sigs)); {28}let (tag: bitstring,p: bitstring,v: bitstring,policy: bitstring,aa: identity,bb: identity,nn: bitstring,sid_1: bitstring,nb: bitstring,pm: pkm,ph: pkh) = verifyL(proofL,lb_1) in {29}let hashOffer: bitstring = verifyS(proofS,sb_1) in {30}if ((tag = offerTag) && ((p = protocol) && ((v = version) && ((policy = dualPolicy) && ((aa = a) && ((bb = b) && (nn = na))))))) then {31}if ((off = (tag,p,v,policy,aa,bb,nn,sid_1,nb,pm,ph)) && (hashOffer = off)) then {32}new rm: bitstring; {33}new rh: bitstring; {34}let cm: ctm = encM(pm,rm) in {35}let ch: cth = encH(ph,rh) in {36}let context: bitstring = (contextTag,p,v,policy,a,b,na,sid_1,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in {37}let root: key = robust(secM(pm,rm),secH(ph,rh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in {38}event BeginA(a,b,context,root); {39}out(net, (responseTag,sid_1,cm,ch,signL(context,la_1),signS(context,sa_1),hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)))); {40}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_1,confirmation: mac)); {41}if (confirmation = hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context))) then {42}event AcceptA(a,b,context,root); {43}event SessionKey(root); {44}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); {45}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); {46}event SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy); {47}new nonce: bitstring; {48}out(net, (nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataA),nonce,context))) ) | ( {50}! {51}let a_1: identity = carol in {52}let la_2: skl = lc in {53}let sa_2: sks = sc in {54}let b_1: identity = bob in {80}get directory(=b_1,lb_2: pkl,sb_2: pks) in {55}event KeyUsed(b_1,lb_2,sb_2); {56}new na_1: bitstring; {57}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_1,b_1,na_1)); {58}in(net, (off_1: bitstring,proofL_1: sigl,proofS_1: sigs)); {59}let (tag_1: bitstring,p_1: bitstring,v_1: bitstring,policy_1: bitstring,aa_1: identity,bb_1: identity,nn_1: bitstring,sid_2: bitstring,nb_1: bitstring,pm_1: pkm,ph_1: pkh) = verifyL(proofL_1,lb_2) in {60}let hashOffer_1: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_1,sb_2) in {61}if ((tag_1 = offerTag) && ((p_1 = protocol) && ((v_1 = version) && ((policy_1 = dualPolicy) && ((aa_1 = a_1) && ((bb_1 = b_1) && (nn_1 = na_1))))))) then {62}if ((off_1 = (tag_1,p_1,v_1,policy_1,aa_1,bb_1,nn_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1)) && (hashOffer_1 = off_1)) then {63}new rm_1: bitstring; {64}new rh_1: bitstring; {65}let cm_1: ctm = encM(pm_1,rm_1) in {66}let ch_1: cth = encH(ph_1,rh_1) in {67}let context_1: bitstring = (contextTag,p_1,v_1,policy_1,a_1,b_1,na_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1,cm_1,ch_1) in {68}let root_1: key = robust(secM(pm_1,rm_1),secH(ph_1,rh_1),cm_1,ch_1,pm_1,ph_1,context_1) in {69}event BeginA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {70}out(net, (responseTag,sid_2,cm_1,ch_1,signL(context_1,la_2),signS(context_1,sa_2),hmac(derive(root_1,confirmA),(a_1,b_1,context_1)))); {71}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_2,confirmation_1: mac)); {72}if (confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(root_1,confirmB),(b_1,a_1,context_1))) then {73}event AcceptA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {74}event SessionKey(root_1); {75}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataA)); {76}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataB)); {77}event SuiteAccepted(p_1,v_1,policy_1); {78}new nonce_1: bitstring; {79}out(net, (nonce_1,context_1,aead(payload,derive(root_1,dataA),nonce_1,context_1))) ) | ( {81}! {82}let b_2: identity = bob in {83}let lb_3: skl = lb in {84}let sb_3: sks = sb in {85}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_2: identity,=b_2,na_2: bitstring)); {113}get directory(=a_2,la_3: pkl,sa_3: pks) in {86}event KeyUsed(a_2,la_3,sa_3); {87}new sid_3: bitstring; {88}new nb_2: bitstring; {89}new km: skm; {90}new kh: skh; {91}let pm_2: pkm = pkM(km) in {92}let ph_2: pkh = pkH(kh) in {93}let offer: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2) in {94}out(net, (offer,signL(offer,lb_3),signS(offer,sb_3))); {95}in(net, (=responseTag,=sid_3,cm_2: ctm,ch_2: cth,proofL_2: sigl,proofS_2: sigs,confirmation_2: mac)); {96}let context_2: bitstring = (contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2,cm_2,ch_2) in {97}let lMessage: bitstring = verifyL(proofL_2,la_3) in {98}let sMessage: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_2,sa_3) in {99}if ((lMessage = context_2) && (sMessage = context_2)) then {100}let root_2: key = robust(decM(cm_2,km),decH(ch_2,kh),cm_2,ch_2,pm_2,ph_2,context_2) in {101}if (confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(root_2,confirmA),(a_2,b_2,context_2))) then {102}if ((a_2 = alice) || (a_2 = carol)) then {103}event BeginB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {104}event AcceptB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {105}event SessionKey(root_2); {106}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataA)); {107}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataB)); {108}event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy); {109}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))); {110}new nonce_2: bitstring; {111}out(net, (nonce_2,context_2,aead(payload,derive(root_2,dataB),nonce_2,context_2))) else {112}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))) ) | ( {114}! {115}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_3: identity,b_3: identity,na_3: bitstring)); {116}new ml: skl; {117}new hs: sks; {118}new km_1: skm; {119}new kh_1: skh; {120}new sid_4: bitstring; {121}new nb_3: bitstring; {122}let off_2: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_3,b_3,na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)) in {123}out(net, (b_3,vkL(ml),vkS(hs))); {124}out(net, (off_2,signL(off_2,ml),signS(off_2,hs))) ) -- Process 1 (that is, process 0, with let moved downwards): {1}new la: skl; {2}new sa: sks; {3}new lb: skl; {4}new sb: sks; {5}new lc: skl; {6}new sc: sks; {7}new lm: skl; {8}new sm: sks; {9}insert directory(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {10}event Registered(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {11}insert directory(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {12}event Registered(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {13}insert directory(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {14}event Registered(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {15}out(net, (alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa),bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb),carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc))); {16}insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {17}event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {18}out(net, (mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm),lm,sm)); ( {19}! {23}let b: identity = bob in {49}get directory(=b,lb_1: pkl,sb_1: pks) in {24}event KeyUsed(b,lb_1,sb_1); {25}new na: bitstring; {20}let a: identity = alice in {26}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na)); {27}in(net, (off: bitstring,proofL: sigl,proofS: sigs)); {28}let (tag: bitstring,p: bitstring,v: bitstring,policy: bitstring,aa: identity,bb: identity,nn: bitstring,sid_1: bitstring,nb: bitstring,pm: pkm,ph: pkh) = verifyL(proofL,lb_1) in {29}let hashOffer: bitstring = verifyS(proofS,sb_1) in {30}if ((tag = offerTag) && ((p = protocol) && ((v = version) && ((policy = dualPolicy) && ((aa = a) && ((bb = b) && (nn = na))))))) then {31}if ((off = (tag,p,v,policy,aa,bb,nn,sid_1,nb,pm,ph)) && (hashOffer = off)) then {32}new rm: bitstring; {33}new rh: bitstring; {35}let ch: cth = encH(ph,rh) in {34}let cm: ctm = encM(pm,rm) in {36}let context: bitstring = (contextTag,p,v,policy,a,b,na,sid_1,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in {37}let root: key = robust(secM(pm,rm),secH(ph,rh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in {38}event BeginA(a,b,context,root); {22}let sa_1: sks = sa in {21}let la_1: skl = la in {39}out(net, (responseTag,sid_1,cm,ch,signL(context,la_1),signS(context,sa_1),hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)))); {40}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_1,confirmation: mac)); {41}if (confirmation = hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context))) then {42}event AcceptA(a,b,context,root); {43}event SessionKey(root); {44}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); {45}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); {46}event SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy); {47}new nonce: bitstring; {48}out(net, (nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataA),nonce,context))) ) | ( {50}! {54}let b_1: identity = bob in {80}get directory(=b_1,lb_2: pkl,sb_2: pks) in {55}event KeyUsed(b_1,lb_2,sb_2); {56}new na_1: bitstring; {51}let a_1: identity = carol in {57}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_1,b_1,na_1)); {58}in(net, (off_1: bitstring,proofL_1: sigl,proofS_1: sigs)); {59}let (tag_1: bitstring,p_1: bitstring,v_1: bitstring,policy_1: bitstring,aa_1: identity,bb_1: identity,nn_1: bitstring,sid_2: bitstring,nb_1: bitstring,pm_1: pkm,ph_1: pkh) = verifyL(proofL_1,lb_2) in {60}let hashOffer_1: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_1,sb_2) in {61}if ((tag_1 = offerTag) && ((p_1 = protocol) && ((v_1 = version) && ((policy_1 = dualPolicy) && ((aa_1 = a_1) && ((bb_1 = b_1) && (nn_1 = na_1))))))) then {62}if ((off_1 = (tag_1,p_1,v_1,policy_1,aa_1,bb_1,nn_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1)) && (hashOffer_1 = off_1)) then {63}new rm_1: bitstring; {64}new rh_1: bitstring; {66}let ch_1: cth = encH(ph_1,rh_1) in {65}let cm_1: ctm = encM(pm_1,rm_1) in {67}let context_1: bitstring = (contextTag,p_1,v_1,policy_1,a_1,b_1,na_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1,cm_1,ch_1) in {68}let root_1: key = robust(secM(pm_1,rm_1),secH(ph_1,rh_1),cm_1,ch_1,pm_1,ph_1,context_1) in {69}event BeginA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {53}let sa_2: sks = sc in {52}let la_2: skl = lc in {70}out(net, (responseTag,sid_2,cm_1,ch_1,signL(context_1,la_2),signS(context_1,sa_2),hmac(derive(root_1,confirmA),(a_1,b_1,context_1)))); {71}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_2,confirmation_1: mac)); {72}if (confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(root_1,confirmB),(b_1,a_1,context_1))) then {73}event AcceptA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {74}event SessionKey(root_1); {75}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataA)); {76}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataB)); {77}event SuiteAccepted(p_1,v_1,policy_1); {78}new nonce_1: bitstring; {79}out(net, (nonce_1,context_1,aead(payload,derive(root_1,dataA),nonce_1,context_1))) ) | ( {81}! {82}let b_2: identity = bob in {85}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_2: identity,=b_2,na_2: bitstring)); {113}get directory(=a_2,la_3: pkl,sa_3: pks) in {86}event KeyUsed(a_2,la_3,sa_3); {87}new sid_3: bitstring; {88}new nb_2: bitstring; {89}new km: skm; {90}new kh: skh; {92}let ph_2: pkh = pkH(kh) in {91}let pm_2: pkm = pkM(km) in {93}let offer: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2) in {84}let sb_3: sks = sb in {83}let lb_3: skl = lb in {94}out(net, (offer,signL(offer,lb_3),signS(offer,sb_3))); {95}in(net, (=responseTag,=sid_3,cm_2: ctm,ch_2: cth,proofL_2: sigl,proofS_2: sigs,confirmation_2: mac)); {97}let lMessage: bitstring = verifyL(proofL_2,la_3) in {98}let sMessage: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_2,sa_3) in {96}let context_2: bitstring = (contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2,cm_2,ch_2) in {99}if ((lMessage = context_2) && (sMessage = context_2)) then {100}let root_2: key = robust(decM(cm_2,km),decH(ch_2,kh),cm_2,ch_2,pm_2,ph_2,context_2) in {101}if (confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(root_2,confirmA),(a_2,b_2,context_2))) then {102}if ((a_2 = alice) || (a_2 = carol)) then {103}event BeginB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {104}event AcceptB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {105}event SessionKey(root_2); {106}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataA)); {107}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataB)); {108}event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy); {109}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))); {110}new nonce_2: bitstring; {111}out(net, (nonce_2,context_2,aead(payload,derive(root_2,dataB),nonce_2,context_2))) else {112}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))) ) | ( {114}! {115}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_3: identity,b_3: identity,na_3: bitstring)); {116}new ml: skl; {117}new hs: sks; {118}new km_1: skm; {119}new kh_1: skh; {120}new sid_4: bitstring; {121}new nb_3: bitstring; {123}out(net, (b_3,vkL(ml),vkS(hs))); {122}let off_2: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_3,b_3,na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)) in {124}out(net, (off_2,signL(off_2,ml),signS(off_2,hs))) ) -- Query not attacker(payload[]) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (95 with conclusion selected). Queue: 34 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 280 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 41 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 351 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 9 rules. Starting query not attacker(payload[]) RESULT not attacker(payload[]) is true. -- Query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (77 with conclusion selected). Queue: 54 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 320 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 53 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 404 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 67 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 455 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 13 rules. Starting query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) RESULT not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) is true. -- Query inj-event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (93 with conclusion selected). Queue: 33 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 286 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 43 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 366 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 18 rules. Starting query inj-event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) goal reachable: b-inj-event(BeginA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ69_1) -> inj-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ104_1) The hypothesis occurs strictly before the conclusion. Abbreviations: na_4 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ104_1 = @occ104[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] @occ69_1 = @occ69[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] goal reachable: b-inj-event(BeginA(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ38_1) -> inj-event(AcceptB(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ104_1) The hypothesis occurs strictly before the conclusion. Abbreviations: na_4 = na[sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ104_1 = @occ104[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sa[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),la[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] @occ38_1 = @occ38[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] RESULT inj-event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. -- Query inj-event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (91 with conclusion selected). Queue: 30 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 284 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 43 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 358 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 14 rules. Starting query inj-event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) goal reachable: b-inj-event(BeginB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ103_1) -> inj-event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ73_1) The hypothesis occurs strictly before the conclusion. Abbreviations: na_4 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ73_1 = @occ73[confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ103_1 = @occ103[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] goal reachable: b-inj-event(BeginB(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ103_1) -> inj-event(AcceptA(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),@occ42_1) The hypothesis occurs strictly before the conclusion. Abbreviations: na_4 = na[sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ42_1 = @occ42[confirmation = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],alice[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ103_1 = @occ103[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sa[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),la[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] RESULT inj-event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. -- Query event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (91 with conclusion selected). Queue: 30 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 284 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 43 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 358 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 14 rules. Starting query event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) goal reachable: b-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) -> event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) Abbreviations: na_4 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] goal reachable: b-event(AcceptB(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) -> event(AcceptA(alice[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) Abbreviations: na_4 = na[sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sa[]),la_3 = vkL(la[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = alice[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh[proofS = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],alice[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_1 = vkS(sb[]),lb_1 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] RESULT event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. -- Query event(KeyUsed(a_4,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_4,l,s)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (93 with conclusion selected). Queue: 30 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 286 rules (102 with conclusion selected). Queue: 41 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 352 rules (112 with conclusion selected). Queue: 14 rules. Starting query event(KeyUsed(a_4,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_4,l,s)) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) RESULT event(KeyUsed(a_4,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_4,l,s)) is true. -- Query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (89 with conclusion selected). Queue: 34 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 293 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 45 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 369 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 23 rules. Starting query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] goal reachable: event(SuiteAccepted(protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[])) RESULT event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] is true. -- Query not event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (91 with conclusion selected). Queue: 30 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 284 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 43 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 358 rules (108 with conclusion selected). Queue: 14 rules. Starting query not event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) goal reachable: event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) Abbreviations: na_4 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: na_4 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] sid_5 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] nb_4 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] km_2 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] kh_2 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_4,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid_1] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] 1. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {11}. table(directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))). 2. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {80}. So the message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4) may be sent to the attacker at output {57}. attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4)). 3. By 2, the attacker may know (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain na_4. attacker(na_4). 4. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 5. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 6. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 7. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 8. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 9. The attacker initially knows requestTag[]. attacker(requestTag[]). 10. By 9, the attacker may know requestTag[]. By 8, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 7, the attacker may know version[]. By 6, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 5, the attacker may know carol[]. By 4, the attacker may know bob[]. By 3, the attacker may know na_4. Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4). attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4)). 11. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {13}. table(directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))). 12. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4) that the attacker may have by 10 may be received at input {85}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 11 may be read at get {113}. So the message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])) may be sent to the attacker at output {94}. attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]))). 13. By 12, the attacker may know ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]). attacker(signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])). 14. By 12, the attacker may know ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]). attacker(signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[])). 15. By 12, the attacker may know ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])). Using the function 1-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2))). 16. By 15, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). Using the function 11-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkH(kh_2). attacker(pkH(kh_2)). 17. By 15, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). Using the function 10-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkM(km_2). attacker(pkM(km_2)). 18. By 15, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). Using the function 9-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain nb_4. attacker(nb_4). 19. By 15, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). Using the function 8-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain sid_5. attacker(sid_5). 20. The attacker initially knows offerTag[]. attacker(offerTag[]). 21. By 20, the attacker may know offerTag[]. By 8, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 7, the attacker may know version[]. By 6, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 5, the attacker may know carol[]. By 4, the attacker may know bob[]. By 3, the attacker may know na_4. By 19, the attacker may know sid_5. By 18, the attacker may know nb_4. By 17, the attacker may know pkM(km_2). By 16, the attacker may know pkH(kh_2). Using the function 11-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2))). 22. By 21, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)). By 14, the attacker may know signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]). By 13, the attacker may know signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])). attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[]))). 23. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {80}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 22 may be received at input {58}. So the message (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {70}. attacker((responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))))). 24. By 23, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). 25. By 23, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 6-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]). attacker(signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[])). 26. By 23, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 5-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]). attacker(signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[])). 27. By 23, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 4-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2). attacker(encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)). 28. By 23, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2). attacker(encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2)). 29. The attacker initially knows responseTag[]. attacker(responseTag[]). 30. By 29, the attacker may know responseTag[]. By 19, the attacker may know sid_5. By 28, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2). By 27, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2). By 26, the attacker may know signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]). By 25, the attacker may know signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]). By 24, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))). Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). attacker((responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))))). 31. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4) that the attacker may have by 10 may be received at input {85}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 11 may be read at get {113}. The message (responseTag[],sid_5,encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 30 may be received at input {95}. So the message (receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {109}. attacker((receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))))). 32. By 31, the attacker may know (receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). 33. The attacker initially knows receiptTag[]. attacker(receiptTag[]). 34. By 33, the attacker may know receiptTag[]. By 19, the attacker may know sid_5. By 32, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). attacker((receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))))). 35. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {80}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 22 may be received at input {58}. The message (receiptTag[],sid_5,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 34 may be received at input {71}. So event AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)))) may be executed at {73}. event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). 36. By 35, event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),secH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_4,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),rm_2),encH(pkH(kh_2),rh_2))))). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} get directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {80} in copy a_4 event KeyUsed(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {55} in copy a_4 new na_1: bitstring creating na_5 at {56} in copy a_4 out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16,~M_17,~M_18,~M_19,~M_20)) with ~M_14 = requestTag, ~M_15 = protocol, ~M_16 = version, ~M_17 = dualPolicy, ~M_18 = carol, ~M_19 = bob, ~M_20 = na_5 at {57} in copy a_4 in(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_20)) with ~M_20 = na_5 at {85} in copy a_5 get directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {113} in copy a_5 event KeyUsed(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {86} in copy a_5 new sid_3: bitstring creating sid_6 at {87} in copy a_5 new nb_2: bitstring creating nb_5 at {88} in copy a_5 new km: skm creating km_3 at {89} in copy a_5 new kh: skh creating kh_3 at {90} in copy a_5 out(net, ((~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31),~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_21 = offerTag, ~M_22 = protocol, ~M_23 = version, ~M_24 = dualPolicy, ~M_25 = carol, ~M_26 = bob, ~M_27 = na_5, ~M_28 = sid_6, ~M_29 = nb_5, ~M_30 = pkM(km_3), ~M_31 = pkH(kh_3), ~M_32 = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3)),lb_4), ~M_33 = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3)),sb_4) at {94} in copy a_5 in(net, ((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_20,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31),~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_20 = na_5, ~M_28 = sid_6, ~M_29 = nb_5, ~M_30 = pkM(km_3), ~M_31 = pkH(kh_3), ~M_32 = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3)),lb_4), ~M_33 = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3)),sb_4) at {58} in copy a_4 new rm_1: bitstring creating rm_3 at {63} in copy a_4 new rh_1: bitstring creating rh_3 at {64} in copy a_4 event BeginA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {69} in copy a_4 out(net, (~M_34,~M_35,~M_36,~M_37,~M_38,~M_39,~M_40)) with ~M_34 = responseTag, ~M_35 = sid_6, ~M_36 = encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3), ~M_37 = encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3), ~M_38 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_39 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_40 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {70} in copy a_4 in(net, (responseTag,~M_28,~M_36,~M_37,~M_38,~M_39,~M_40)) with ~M_28 = sid_6, ~M_36 = encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3), ~M_37 = encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3), ~M_38 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_39 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_40 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {95} in copy a_5 event BeginB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {103} in copy a_5 event AcceptB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {104} in copy a_5 event SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {105} in copy a_5 event SessionKey(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),dataA)) at {106} in copy a_5 event SessionKey(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),dataB)) at {107} in copy a_5 event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy) at {108} in copy a_5 out(net, (~M_41,~M_42,~M_43)) with ~M_41 = receiptTag, ~M_42 = sid_6, ~M_43 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {109} in copy a_5 new nonce_2: bitstring creating nonce_3 at {110} in copy a_5 out(net, (~M_44,(~M_45,~M_46,~M_47,~M_48,~M_49,~M_50,~M_51,~M_52,~M_53,~M_54,~M_55,~M_56,~M_57),~M_58)) with ~M_44 = nonce_3, ~M_45 = contextTag, ~M_46 = protocol, ~M_47 = version, ~M_48 = dualPolicy, ~M_49 = carol, ~M_50 = bob, ~M_51 = na_5, ~M_52 = sid_6, ~M_53 = nb_5, ~M_54 = pkM(km_3), ~M_55 = pkH(kh_3), ~M_56 = encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3), ~M_57 = encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3), ~M_58 = aead(payload,derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),dataB),nonce_3,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))) at {111} in copy a_5 in(net, (receiptTag,~M_28,~M_43)) with ~M_28 = sid_6, ~M_43 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {71} in copy a_4 event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) at {73} in copy a_4 (goal) The event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),secH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3),pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_5,sid_6,nb_5,pkM(km_3),pkH(kh_3),encM(pkM(km_3),rm_3),encH(pkH(kh_3),rh_3)))) is executed at {73} in copy a_4. A trace has been found. RESULT not event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is false. -------------------------------------------------------------- Verification summary: Query not attacker(payload[]) is true. Query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) is true. Query inj-event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. Query inj-event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. Query event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is true. Query event(KeyUsed(a_4,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_4,l,s)) is true. Query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] is true. Query not event(AcceptA(a_4,b_4,t,k)) is false. --------------------------------------------------------------