File "CDE-004-both_signature_families_compromised.txt", line 70, characters 102-104: Warning: identifier sid rebound. File "CDE-004-both_signature_families_compromised.txt", line 94, characters 9-11: Warning: identifier sid rebound. Process 0 (that is, the initial process): {1}new la: skl; {2}new sa: sks; {3}new lb: skl; {4}new sb: sks; {5}new lc: skl; {6}new sc: sks; {7}new lm: skl; {8}new sm: sks; {9}insert directory(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {10}event Registered(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {11}insert directory(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {12}event Registered(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {13}insert directory(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {14}event Registered(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {15}out(net, (alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa),bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb),carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc))); {16}insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {17}event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {18}out(net, (mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm),lm,sm)); {19}out(net, (la,lb,lc)); {20}out(net, (sa,sb,sc)); ( {21}! {22}let a: identity = alice in {23}let la_1: skl = la in {24}let sa_1: sks = sa in {25}let b: identity = bob in {51}get directory(=b,lb_1: pkl,sb_1: pks) in {26}event KeyUsed(b,lb_1,sb_1); {27}new na: bitstring; {28}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na)); {29}in(net, (off: bitstring,proofL: sigl,proofS: sigs)); {30}let (tag: bitstring,p: bitstring,v: bitstring,policy: bitstring,aa: identity,bb: identity,nn: bitstring,sid_1: bitstring,nb: bitstring,pm: pkm,ph: pkh) = verifyL(proofL,lb_1) in {31}let hashOffer: bitstring = verifyS(proofS,sb_1) in {32}if ((tag = offerTag) && ((p = protocol) && ((v = version) && ((policy = dualPolicy) && ((aa = a) && ((bb = b) && (nn = na))))))) then {33}if ((off = (tag,p,v,policy,aa,bb,nn,sid_1,nb,pm,ph)) && (hashOffer = off)) then {34}new rm: bitstring; {35}new rh: bitstring; {36}let cm: ctm = encM(pm,rm) in {37}let ch: cth = encH(ph,rh) in {38}let context: bitstring = (contextTag,p,v,policy,a,b,na,sid_1,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in {39}let root: key = robust(secM(pm,rm),secH(ph,rh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in {40}event BeginA(a,b,context,root); {41}out(net, (responseTag,sid_1,cm,ch,signL(context,la_1),signS(context,sa_1),hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)))); {42}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_1,confirmation: mac)); {43}if (confirmation = hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context))) then {44}event AcceptA(a,b,context,root); {45}event SessionKey(root); {46}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); {47}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); {48}event SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy); {49}new nonce: bitstring; {50}out(net, (nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataA),nonce,context))) ) | ( {52}! {53}let a_1: identity = carol in {54}let la_2: skl = lc in {55}let sa_2: sks = sc in {56}let b_1: identity = bob in {82}get directory(=b_1,lb_2: pkl,sb_2: pks) in {57}event KeyUsed(b_1,lb_2,sb_2); {58}new na_1: bitstring; {59}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_1,b_1,na_1)); {60}in(net, (off_1: bitstring,proofL_1: sigl,proofS_1: sigs)); {61}let (tag_1: bitstring,p_1: bitstring,v_1: bitstring,policy_1: bitstring,aa_1: identity,bb_1: identity,nn_1: bitstring,sid_2: bitstring,nb_1: bitstring,pm_1: pkm,ph_1: pkh) = verifyL(proofL_1,lb_2) in {62}let hashOffer_1: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_1,sb_2) in {63}if ((tag_1 = offerTag) && ((p_1 = protocol) && ((v_1 = version) && ((policy_1 = dualPolicy) && ((aa_1 = a_1) && ((bb_1 = b_1) && (nn_1 = na_1))))))) then {64}if ((off_1 = (tag_1,p_1,v_1,policy_1,aa_1,bb_1,nn_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1)) && (hashOffer_1 = off_1)) then {65}new rm_1: bitstring; {66}new rh_1: bitstring; {67}let cm_1: ctm = encM(pm_1,rm_1) in {68}let ch_1: cth = encH(ph_1,rh_1) in {69}let context_1: bitstring = (contextTag,p_1,v_1,policy_1,a_1,b_1,na_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1,cm_1,ch_1) in {70}let root_1: key = robust(secM(pm_1,rm_1),secH(ph_1,rh_1),cm_1,ch_1,pm_1,ph_1,context_1) in {71}event BeginA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {72}out(net, (responseTag,sid_2,cm_1,ch_1,signL(context_1,la_2),signS(context_1,sa_2),hmac(derive(root_1,confirmA),(a_1,b_1,context_1)))); {73}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_2,confirmation_1: mac)); {74}if (confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(root_1,confirmB),(b_1,a_1,context_1))) then {75}event AcceptA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {76}event SessionKey(root_1); {77}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataA)); {78}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataB)); {79}event SuiteAccepted(p_1,v_1,policy_1); {80}new nonce_1: bitstring; {81}out(net, (nonce_1,context_1,aead(payload,derive(root_1,dataA),nonce_1,context_1))) ) | ( {83}! {84}let b_2: identity = bob in {85}let lb_3: skl = lb in {86}let sb_3: sks = sb in {87}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_2: identity,=b_2,na_2: bitstring)); {115}get directory(=a_2,la_3: pkl,sa_3: pks) in {88}event KeyUsed(a_2,la_3,sa_3); {89}new sid_3: bitstring; {90}new nb_2: bitstring; {91}new km: skm; {92}new kh: skh; {93}let pm_2: pkm = pkM(km) in {94}let ph_2: pkh = pkH(kh) in {95}let offer: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2) in {96}out(net, (offer,signL(offer,lb_3),signS(offer,sb_3))); {97}in(net, (=responseTag,=sid_3,cm_2: ctm,ch_2: cth,proofL_2: sigl,proofS_2: sigs,confirmation_2: mac)); {98}let context_2: bitstring = (contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2,cm_2,ch_2) in {99}let lMessage: bitstring = verifyL(proofL_2,la_3) in {100}let sMessage: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_2,sa_3) in {101}if ((lMessage = context_2) && (sMessage = context_2)) then {102}let root_2: key = robust(decM(cm_2,km),decH(ch_2,kh),cm_2,ch_2,pm_2,ph_2,context_2) in {103}if (confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(root_2,confirmA),(a_2,b_2,context_2))) then {104}if ((a_2 = alice) || (a_2 = carol)) then {105}event BeginB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {106}event AcceptB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {107}event SessionKey(root_2); {108}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataA)); {109}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataB)); {110}event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy); {111}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))); {112}new nonce_2: bitstring; {113}out(net, (nonce_2,context_2,aead(payload,derive(root_2,dataB),nonce_2,context_2))) else {114}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))) ) -- Process 1 (that is, process 0, with let moved downwards): {1}new la: skl; {2}new sa: sks; {3}new lb: skl; {4}new sb: sks; {5}new lc: skl; {6}new sc: sks; {7}new lm: skl; {8}new sm: sks; {9}insert directory(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {10}event Registered(alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa)); {11}insert directory(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {12}event Registered(bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb)); {13}insert directory(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {14}event Registered(carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc)); {15}out(net, (alice,vkL(la),vkS(sa),bob,vkL(lb),vkS(sb),carol,vkL(lc),vkS(sc))); {16}insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {17}event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm)); {18}out(net, (mallory,vkL(lm),vkS(sm),lm,sm)); {19}out(net, (la,lb,lc)); {20}out(net, (sa,sb,sc)); ( {21}! {25}let b: identity = bob in {51}get directory(=b,lb_1: pkl,sb_1: pks) in {26}event KeyUsed(b,lb_1,sb_1); {27}new na: bitstring; {22}let a: identity = alice in {28}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a,b,na)); {29}in(net, (off: bitstring,proofL: sigl,proofS: sigs)); {30}let (tag: bitstring,p: bitstring,v: bitstring,policy: bitstring,aa: identity,bb: identity,nn: bitstring,sid_1: bitstring,nb: bitstring,pm: pkm,ph: pkh) = verifyL(proofL,lb_1) in {31}let hashOffer: bitstring = verifyS(proofS,sb_1) in {32}if ((tag = offerTag) && ((p = protocol) && ((v = version) && ((policy = dualPolicy) && ((aa = a) && ((bb = b) && (nn = na))))))) then {33}if ((off = (tag,p,v,policy,aa,bb,nn,sid_1,nb,pm,ph)) && (hashOffer = off)) then {34}new rm: bitstring; {35}new rh: bitstring; {37}let ch: cth = encH(ph,rh) in {36}let cm: ctm = encM(pm,rm) in {38}let context: bitstring = (contextTag,p,v,policy,a,b,na,sid_1,nb,pm,ph,cm,ch) in {39}let root: key = robust(secM(pm,rm),secH(ph,rh),cm,ch,pm,ph,context) in {40}event BeginA(a,b,context,root); {24}let sa_1: sks = sa in {23}let la_1: skl = la in {41}out(net, (responseTag,sid_1,cm,ch,signL(context,la_1),signS(context,sa_1),hmac(derive(root,confirmA),(a,b,context)))); {42}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_1,confirmation: mac)); {43}if (confirmation = hmac(derive(root,confirmB),(b,a,context))) then {44}event AcceptA(a,b,context,root); {45}event SessionKey(root); {46}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataA)); {47}event SessionKey(derive(root,dataB)); {48}event SuiteAccepted(p,v,policy); {49}new nonce: bitstring; {50}out(net, (nonce,context,aead(payload,derive(root,dataA),nonce,context))) ) | ( {52}! {56}let b_1: identity = bob in {82}get directory(=b_1,lb_2: pkl,sb_2: pks) in {57}event KeyUsed(b_1,lb_2,sb_2); {58}new na_1: bitstring; {53}let a_1: identity = carol in {59}out(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_1,b_1,na_1)); {60}in(net, (off_1: bitstring,proofL_1: sigl,proofS_1: sigs)); {61}let (tag_1: bitstring,p_1: bitstring,v_1: bitstring,policy_1: bitstring,aa_1: identity,bb_1: identity,nn_1: bitstring,sid_2: bitstring,nb_1: bitstring,pm_1: pkm,ph_1: pkh) = verifyL(proofL_1,lb_2) in {62}let hashOffer_1: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_1,sb_2) in {63}if ((tag_1 = offerTag) && ((p_1 = protocol) && ((v_1 = version) && ((policy_1 = dualPolicy) && ((aa_1 = a_1) && ((bb_1 = b_1) && (nn_1 = na_1))))))) then {64}if ((off_1 = (tag_1,p_1,v_1,policy_1,aa_1,bb_1,nn_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1)) && (hashOffer_1 = off_1)) then {65}new rm_1: bitstring; {66}new rh_1: bitstring; {68}let ch_1: cth = encH(ph_1,rh_1) in {67}let cm_1: ctm = encM(pm_1,rm_1) in {69}let context_1: bitstring = (contextTag,p_1,v_1,policy_1,a_1,b_1,na_1,sid_2,nb_1,pm_1,ph_1,cm_1,ch_1) in {70}let root_1: key = robust(secM(pm_1,rm_1),secH(ph_1,rh_1),cm_1,ch_1,pm_1,ph_1,context_1) in {71}event BeginA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {55}let sa_2: sks = sc in {54}let la_2: skl = lc in {72}out(net, (responseTag,sid_2,cm_1,ch_1,signL(context_1,la_2),signS(context_1,sa_2),hmac(derive(root_1,confirmA),(a_1,b_1,context_1)))); {73}in(net, (=receiptTag,=sid_2,confirmation_1: mac)); {74}if (confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(root_1,confirmB),(b_1,a_1,context_1))) then {75}event AcceptA(a_1,b_1,context_1,root_1); {76}event SessionKey(root_1); {77}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataA)); {78}event SessionKey(derive(root_1,dataB)); {79}event SuiteAccepted(p_1,v_1,policy_1); {80}new nonce_1: bitstring; {81}out(net, (nonce_1,context_1,aead(payload,derive(root_1,dataA),nonce_1,context_1))) ) | ( {83}! {84}let b_2: identity = bob in {87}in(net, (=requestTag,=protocol,=version,=dualPolicy,a_2: identity,=b_2,na_2: bitstring)); {115}get directory(=a_2,la_3: pkl,sa_3: pks) in {88}event KeyUsed(a_2,la_3,sa_3); {89}new sid_3: bitstring; {90}new nb_2: bitstring; {91}new km: skm; {92}new kh: skh; {94}let ph_2: pkh = pkH(kh) in {93}let pm_2: pkm = pkM(km) in {95}let offer: bitstring = (offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2) in {86}let sb_3: sks = sb in {85}let lb_3: skl = lb in {96}out(net, (offer,signL(offer,lb_3),signS(offer,sb_3))); {97}in(net, (=responseTag,=sid_3,cm_2: ctm,ch_2: cth,proofL_2: sigl,proofS_2: sigs,confirmation_2: mac)); {99}let lMessage: bitstring = verifyL(proofL_2,la_3) in {100}let sMessage: bitstring = verifyS(proofS_2,sa_3) in {98}let context_2: bitstring = (contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,a_2,b_2,na_2,sid_3,nb_2,pm_2,ph_2,cm_2,ch_2) in {101}if ((lMessage = context_2) && (sMessage = context_2)) then {102}let root_2: key = robust(decM(cm_2,km),decH(ch_2,kh),cm_2,ch_2,pm_2,ph_2,context_2) in {103}if (confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(root_2,confirmA),(a_2,b_2,context_2))) then {104}if ((a_2 = alice) || (a_2 = carol)) then {105}event BeginB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {106}event AcceptB(a_2,b_2,context_2,root_2); {107}event SessionKey(root_2); {108}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataA)); {109}event SessionKey(derive(root_2,dataB)); {110}event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy); {111}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))); {112}new nonce_2: bitstring; {113}out(net, (nonce_2,context_2,aead(payload,derive(root_2,dataB),nonce_2,context_2))) else {114}out(net, (receiptTag,sid_3,hmac(derive(root_2,confirmB),(b_2,a_2,context_2)))) ) -- Query not attacker(payload[]) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 193 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 22 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 290 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 57 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 353 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 110 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 437 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 91 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 526 rules (100 with conclusion selected). Queue: 13 rules. Starting query not attacker(payload[]) goal reachable: attacker(payload[]) Derivation: Abbreviations: km_1 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] kh_1 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] sid_4 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] nb_3 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] nonce_3 = nonce_2[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_1),coins),sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] 1. The attacker has some term coins_1. attacker(coins_1). 2. The attacker has some term na_3. attacker(na_3). 3. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 4. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 5. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 6. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 7. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 8. The attacker initially knows requestTag[]. attacker(requestTag[]). 9. By 8, the attacker may know requestTag[]. By 7, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 6, the attacker may know version[]. By 5, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 4, the attacker may know carol[]. By 3, the attacker may know bob[]. By 2, the attacker may know na_3. Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 10. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {13}. table(directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))). 11. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) that the attacker may have by 9 may be received at input {87}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 10 may be read at get {115}. So the message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[])) may be sent to the attacker at output {96}. attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[]))). 12. By 11, the attacker may know ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[])). Using the function 1-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1))). 13. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 11-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkH(kh_1). attacker(pkH(kh_1)). 14. By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 1, the attacker may know coins_1. Using the function encH the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). attacker(encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). 15. The attacker has some term coins. attacker(coins). 16. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 10-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkM(km_1). attacker(pkM(km_1)). 17. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 15, the attacker may know coins. Using the function encM the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(km_1),coins). attacker(encM(pkM(km_1),coins)). 18. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 9-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain nb_3. attacker(nb_3). 19. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 8-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain sid_4. attacker(sid_4). 20. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 21. By 20, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 7, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 6, the attacker may know version[]. By 5, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 4, the attacker may know carol[]. By 3, the attacker may know bob[]. By 2, the attacker may know na_3. By 19, the attacker may know sid_4. By 18, the attacker may know nb_3. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). 22. By 4, the attacker may know carol[]. By 3, the attacker may know bob[]. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). attacker((carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). 23. The attacker initially knows confirmA[]. attacker(confirmA[]). 24. By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 1, the attacker may know coins_1. Using the function secH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). attacker(secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). 25. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 15, the attacker may know coins. Using the function secM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(km_1),coins). attacker(secM(pkM(km_1),coins)). 26. By 25, the attacker may know secM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 24, the attacker may know secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). 27. By 26, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). By 23, the attacker may know confirmA[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[])). 28. By 27, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]). By 22, the attacker may know (carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))). 29. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 30. By 29, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sc[]. attacker(sc[]). 31. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). By 30, the attacker may know sc[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]). attacker(signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[])). 32. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 33. By 32, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lc[]. attacker(lc[]). 34. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). By 33, the attacker may know lc[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]). attacker(signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[])). 35. The attacker initially knows responseTag[]. attacker(responseTag[]). 36. By 35, the attacker may know responseTag[]. By 19, the attacker may know sid_4. By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 34, the attacker may know signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]). By 31, the attacker may know signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]). By 28, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))). attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))))). 37. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) that the attacker may have by 9 may be received at input {87}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 10 may be read at get {115}. The message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))) that the attacker may have by 36 may be received at input {97}. So the message (nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))) may be sent to the attacker at output {113}. attacker((nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))). 38. By 37, the attacker may know (nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). Using the function 1-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain nonce_3. attacker(nonce_3). 39. The attacker initially knows dataB[]. attacker(dataB[]). 40. By 26, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). By 39, the attacker may know dataB[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[])). 41. By 37, the attacker may know (nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). attacker(aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). 42. By 41, the attacker may know aead(payload[],derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]),nonce_3,(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). By 40, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),dataB[]). By 38, the attacker may know nonce_3. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). Using the function open the attacker may obtain payload[]. attacker(payload[]). 43. By 42, attacker(payload[]). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: attacker(payload[]). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} in(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3)) at {87} in copy a_4 get directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {115} in copy a_4 event KeyUsed(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {88} in copy a_4 new sid_3: bitstring creating sid_5 at {89} in copy a_4 new nb_2: bitstring creating nb_4 at {90} in copy a_4 new km: skm creating km_2 at {91} in copy a_4 new kh: skh creating kh_2 at {92} in copy a_4 out(net, ((~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30),~M_31,~M_32)) with ~M_20 = offerTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = a_3, ~M_27 = sid_5, ~M_28 = nb_4, ~M_29 = pkM(km_2), ~M_30 = pkH(kh_2), ~M_31 = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb_4), ~M_32 = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_4) at {96} in copy a_4 in(net, (responseTag,~M_27,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_16),signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_19),hmac(derive(robust(secM(~M_29,a_5),secH(~M_30,a_6),encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),~M_29,~M_30,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)))))) with ~M_27 = sid_5, encM(~M_29,a_5) = encM(pkM(km_2),a_5), encH(~M_30,a_6) = encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6), signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_16) = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),lc_1), signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_19) = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),sc_1), hmac(derive(robust(secM(~M_29,a_5),secH(~M_30,a_6),encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),~M_29,~M_30,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {97} in copy a_4 event BeginB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {105} in copy a_4 event AcceptB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {106} in copy a_4 event SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {107} in copy a_4 event SessionKey(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),dataA)) at {108} in copy a_4 event SessionKey(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),dataB)) at {109} in copy a_4 event SuiteAccepted(protocol,version,dualPolicy) at {110} in copy a_4 out(net, (~M_33,~M_34,~M_35)) with ~M_33 = receiptTag, ~M_34 = sid_5, ~M_35 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {111} in copy a_4 new nonce_2: bitstring creating nonce_4 at {112} in copy a_4 out(net, (~M_36,(~M_37,~M_38,~M_39,~M_40,~M_41,~M_42,~M_43,~M_44,~M_45,~M_46,~M_47,~M_48,~M_49),~M_50)) with ~M_36 = nonce_4, ~M_37 = contextTag, ~M_38 = protocol, ~M_39 = version, ~M_40 = dualPolicy, ~M_41 = carol, ~M_42 = bob, ~M_43 = a_3, ~M_44 = sid_5, ~M_45 = nb_4, ~M_46 = pkM(km_2), ~M_47 = pkH(kh_2), ~M_48 = encM(pkM(km_2),a_5), ~M_49 = encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6), ~M_50 = aead(payload,derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),dataB),nonce_4,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))) at {113} in copy a_4 The attacker has the message open(~M_50,derive(robust(secM(~M_29,a_5),secH(~M_30,a_6),encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),~M_29,~M_30,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))),dataB),~M_36,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))) = payload. A trace has been found. RESULT not attacker(payload[]) is false. -- Query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 200 rules (77 with conclusion selected). Queue: 52 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 336 rules (94 with conclusion selected). Queue: 39 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 404 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 142 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 464 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 194 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 522 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 192 rules. 1200 rules inserted. Base: 622 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 185 rules. 1400 rules inserted. Base: 712 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 148 rules. 1600 rules inserted. Base: 782 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 78 rules. 1800 rules inserted. Base: 842 rules (130 with conclusion selected). Queue: 8 rules. Starting query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) goal reachable: attacker(sid_4) && attacker(nb_3) && attacker(sk) && attacker(sk_1) -> event(SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) && attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))) Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] 1. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {11}. table(directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))). 2. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 3. By 2, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sb[]. attacker(sb[]). 4. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk_1). 5. By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function pkH the attacker may obtain pkH(sk_1). attacker(pkH(sk_1)). 6. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk). 7. By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function pkM the attacker may obtain pkM(sk). attacker(pkM(sk)). 8. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(nb_3). 9. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sid_4). 10. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. So the message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) may be sent to the attacker at output {59}. attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 11. By 10, the attacker may know (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain na_3. attacker(na_3). 12. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 13. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 14. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 15. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 16. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 17. The attacker initially knows offerTag[]. attacker(offerTag[]). 18. By 17, the attacker may know offerTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). Using the function 11-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1))). 19. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 3, the attacker may know sb[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). attacker(signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). 20. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 21. By 20, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lb[]. attacker(lb[]). 22. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 21, the attacker may know lb[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). attacker(signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[])). 23. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 22, the attacker may know signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). By 19, the attacker may know signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]))). 24. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. So the message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {72}. attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 25. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 4-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 26. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(encM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 27. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 28. By 27, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). 29. By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function decH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 30. By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function decM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 31. By 30, the attacker may know secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 29, the attacker may know secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 32. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker((bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 33. The attacker initially knows confirmB[]. attacker(confirmB[]). 34. By 31, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). By 33, the attacker may know confirmB[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[])). 35. By 34, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). By 32, the attacker may know (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 36. The attacker initially knows receiptTag[]. attacker(receiptTag[]). 37. By 36, the attacker may know receiptTag[]. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 35, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). attacker((receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 38. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. The message (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 37 may be received at input {73}. So event SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))) may be executed at {76}. event(SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 39. By 38, event(SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). By 31, attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). The goals are reached, combined in the following fact: event(SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) && attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} get directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {82} in copy a_3 event KeyUsed(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {57} in copy a_3 new na_1: bitstring creating na_4 at {58} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26)) with ~M_20 = requestTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = na_4 at {59} in copy a_3 in(net, ((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15),signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18))) with ~M_26 = na_4, signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15) = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),lb_4), signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18) = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),sb_4) at {60} in copy a_3 new rm_1: bitstring creating rm_3 at {65} in copy a_3 new rh_1: bitstring creating rh_3 at {66} in copy a_3 event BeginA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {71} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31,~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_27 = responseTag, ~M_28 = a_4, ~M_29 = encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3), ~M_30 = encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3), ~M_31 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_32 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_33 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {72} in copy a_3 in(net, (receiptTag,a_4,hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))))) with hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {73} in copy a_3 event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {75} in copy a_3 event SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {76} in copy a_3 (goal) The event SessionKey(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) is executed at {76} in copy a_3. The attacker has the message robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)) = robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))). A trace has been found. RESULT not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) is false. -- Query inj-event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 195 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 26 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 301 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 61 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 372 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 134 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 428 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 131 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 522 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 102 rules. 1200 rules inserted. Base: 608 rules (104 with conclusion selected). Queue: 14 rules. Starting query inj-event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) goal reachable: attacker(coins) && attacker(coins_1) && attacker(na_3) -> inj-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),@occ106_1) Abbreviations: sid_4 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] nb_3 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] km_1 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] kh_1 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] @occ106_1 = @occ106[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_1),coins),sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: sid_4 = sid_3[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] nb_3 = nb_2[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] km_1 = km[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] kh_1 = kh[sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] @occ106_1 = @occ106[confirmation_2 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),proofS_2 = signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),proofL_2 = signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),ch_2 = encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),cm_2 = encM(pkM(km_1),coins),sa_3 = vkS(sc[]),la_3 = vkL(lc[]),na_2 = na_3,a_2 = carol[],!1 = @sid] 1. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(na_3). 2. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 3. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 4. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 5. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 6. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 7. The attacker initially knows requestTag[]. attacker(requestTag[]). 8. By 7, the attacker may know requestTag[]. By 6, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 5, the attacker may know version[]. By 4, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 3, the attacker may know carol[]. By 2, the attacker may know bob[]. By 1, the attacker may know na_3. Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 9. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {13}. table(directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))). 10. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(coins_1). 11. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) that the attacker may have by 8 may be received at input {87}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 9 may be read at get {115}. So the message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[])) may be sent to the attacker at output {96}. attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[]))). 12. By 11, the attacker may know ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)),sb[])). Using the function 1-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1))). 13. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 11-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkH(kh_1). attacker(pkH(kh_1)). 14. By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 10, the attacker may know coins_1. Using the function encH the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). attacker(encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). 15. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(coins). 16. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 10-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain pkM(km_1). attacker(pkM(km_1)). 17. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 15, the attacker may know coins. Using the function encM the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(km_1),coins). attacker(encM(pkM(km_1),coins)). 18. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 9-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain nb_3. attacker(nb_3). 19. By 12, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1)). Using the function 8-proj-11-tuple the attacker may obtain sid_4. attacker(sid_4). 20. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 21. By 20, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 6, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 5, the attacker may know version[]. By 4, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 3, the attacker may know carol[]. By 2, the attacker may know bob[]. By 1, the attacker may know na_3. By 19, the attacker may know sid_4. By 18, the attacker may know nb_3. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). 22. By 3, the attacker may know carol[]. By 2, the attacker may know bob[]. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). attacker((carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). 23. The attacker initially knows confirmA[]. attacker(confirmA[]). 24. By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 10, the attacker may know coins_1. Using the function secH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). attacker(secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). 25. By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 15, the attacker may know coins. Using the function secM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(km_1),coins). attacker(secM(pkM(km_1),coins)). 26. By 25, the attacker may know secM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 24, the attacker may know secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 16, the attacker may know pkM(km_1). By 13, the attacker may know pkH(kh_1). By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). 27. By 26, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). By 23, the attacker may know confirmA[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[])). 28. By 27, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]). By 22, the attacker may know (carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))). 29. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 30. By 29, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sc[]. attacker(sc[]). 31. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). By 30, the attacker may know sc[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]). attacker(signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[])). 32. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 33. By 32, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 3-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lc[]. attacker(lc[]). 34. By 21, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)). By 33, the attacker may know lc[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]). attacker(signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[])). 35. The attacker initially knows responseTag[]. attacker(responseTag[]). 36. By 35, the attacker may know responseTag[]. By 19, the attacker may know sid_4. By 17, the attacker may know encM(pkM(km_1),coins). By 14, the attacker may know encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1). By 34, the attacker may know signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]). By 31, the attacker may know signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]). By 28, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))). Using the function 7-tuple the attacker may obtain (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))). attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))))). 37. The message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) that the attacker may have by 8 may be received at input {87}. The entry directory(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[])) that may be in a table by 9 may be read at get {115}. The message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1))))) that the attacker may have by 36 may be received at input {97}. So event AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))) may be executed at {106} in session @sid. inj-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),@occ106_1). 38. By 37, inj-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),@occ106_1). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: inj-event(AcceptB(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)),robust(secM(pkM(km_1),coins),secH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1),pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(km_1),pkH(kh_1),encM(pkM(km_1),coins),encH(pkH(kh_1),coins_1)))),@occ106_1). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} in(net, (requestTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3)) at {87} in copy a_4 get directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {115} in copy a_4 event KeyUsed(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {88} in copy a_4 new sid_3: bitstring creating sid_5 at {89} in copy a_4 new nb_2: bitstring creating nb_4 at {90} in copy a_4 new km: skm creating km_2 at {91} in copy a_4 new kh: skh creating kh_2 at {92} in copy a_4 out(net, ((~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30),~M_31,~M_32)) with ~M_20 = offerTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = a_3, ~M_27 = sid_5, ~M_28 = nb_4, ~M_29 = pkM(km_2), ~M_30 = pkH(kh_2), ~M_31 = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),lb_4), ~M_32 = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2)),sb_4) at {96} in copy a_4 in(net, (responseTag,~M_27,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_16),signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_19),hmac(derive(robust(secM(~M_29,a_5),secH(~M_30,a_6),encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),~M_29,~M_30,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)))))) with ~M_27 = sid_5, encM(~M_29,a_5) = encM(pkM(km_2),a_5), encH(~M_30,a_6) = encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6), signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_16) = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),lc_1), signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)),~M_19) = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),sc_1), hmac(derive(robust(secM(~M_29,a_5),secH(~M_30,a_6),encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6),~M_29,~M_30,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,encM(~M_29,a_5),encH(~M_30,a_6)))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {97} in copy a_4 event BeginB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {105} in copy a_4 event AcceptB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) at {106} in copy a_4 (goal) The event AcceptB(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)),robust(secM(pkM(km_2),a_5),secH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6),pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,a_3,sid_5,nb_4,pkM(km_2),pkH(kh_2),encM(pkM(km_2),a_5),encH(pkH(kh_2),a_6)))) is executed at {106} in copy a_4. A trace has been found. RESULT inj-event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. RESULT (even event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(BeginA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false.) -- Query inj-event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 197 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 28 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 295 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 53 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 365 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 108 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 442 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 99 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 522 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 44 rules. 1200 rules inserted. Base: 576 rules (114 with conclusion selected). Queue: 9 rules. Starting query inj-event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) goal reachable: attacker(sid_4) && attacker(nb_3) && attacker(sk) && attacker(sk_1) -> inj-event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),@occ75_1) Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ75_1 = @occ75[confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] @occ75_1 = @occ75[confirmation_1 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] 1. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {11}. table(directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))). 2. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 3. By 2, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sb[]. attacker(sb[]). 4. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk_1). 5. By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function pkH the attacker may obtain pkH(sk_1). attacker(pkH(sk_1)). 6. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk). 7. By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function pkM the attacker may obtain pkM(sk). attacker(pkM(sk)). 8. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(nb_3). 9. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sid_4). 10. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. So the message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) may be sent to the attacker at output {59}. attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 11. By 10, the attacker may know (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain na_3. attacker(na_3). 12. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 13. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 14. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 15. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 16. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 17. The attacker initially knows offerTag[]. attacker(offerTag[]). 18. By 17, the attacker may know offerTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). Using the function 11-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1))). 19. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 3, the attacker may know sb[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). attacker(signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). 20. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 21. By 20, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lb[]. attacker(lb[]). 22. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 21, the attacker may know lb[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). attacker(signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[])). 23. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 22, the attacker may know signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). By 19, the attacker may know signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]))). 24. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. So the message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {72}. attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 25. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 4-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 26. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(encM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 27. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 28. By 27, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). 29. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker((bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 30. The attacker initially knows confirmB[]. attacker(confirmB[]). 31. By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function decH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 32. By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function decM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 33. By 32, the attacker may know secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 31, the attacker may know secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 34. By 33, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). By 30, the attacker may know confirmB[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[])). 35. By 34, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). By 29, the attacker may know (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 36. The attacker initially knows receiptTag[]. attacker(receiptTag[]). 37. By 36, the attacker may know receiptTag[]. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 35, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). attacker((receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 38. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. The message (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 37 may be received at input {73}. So event AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))) may be executed at {75} in session @sid. inj-event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),@occ75_1). 39. By 38, inj-event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),@occ75_1). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: inj-event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))),@occ75_1). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} get directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {82} in copy a_3 event KeyUsed(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {57} in copy a_3 new na_1: bitstring creating na_4 at {58} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26)) with ~M_20 = requestTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = na_4 at {59} in copy a_3 in(net, ((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15),signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18))) with ~M_26 = na_4, signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15) = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),lb_4), signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18) = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),sb_4) at {60} in copy a_3 new rm_1: bitstring creating rm_3 at {65} in copy a_3 new rh_1: bitstring creating rh_3 at {66} in copy a_3 event BeginA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {71} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31,~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_27 = responseTag, ~M_28 = a_4, ~M_29 = encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3), ~M_30 = encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3), ~M_31 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_32 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_33 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {72} in copy a_3 in(net, (receiptTag,a_4,hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))))) with hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {73} in copy a_3 event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {75} in copy a_3 (goal) The event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) is executed at {75} in copy a_3. A trace has been found. RESULT inj-event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. RESULT (even event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(BeginB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false.) -- Query event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 197 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 28 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 295 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 53 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 365 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 108 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 442 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 99 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 522 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 44 rules. 1200 rules inserted. Base: 576 rules (114 with conclusion selected). Queue: 9 rules. Starting query event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) goal reachable: attacker(sid_4) && attacker(nb_3) && attacker(sk) && attacker(sk_1) -> event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] 1. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {11}. table(directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))). 2. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 3. By 2, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sb[]. attacker(sb[]). 4. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk_1). 5. By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function pkH the attacker may obtain pkH(sk_1). attacker(pkH(sk_1)). 6. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk). 7. By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function pkM the attacker may obtain pkM(sk). attacker(pkM(sk)). 8. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(nb_3). 9. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sid_4). 10. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. So the message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) may be sent to the attacker at output {59}. attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 11. By 10, the attacker may know (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain na_3. attacker(na_3). 12. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 13. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 14. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 15. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 16. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 17. The attacker initially knows offerTag[]. attacker(offerTag[]). 18. By 17, the attacker may know offerTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). Using the function 11-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1))). 19. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 3, the attacker may know sb[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). attacker(signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). 20. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 21. By 20, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lb[]. attacker(lb[]). 22. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 21, the attacker may know lb[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). attacker(signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[])). 23. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 22, the attacker may know signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). By 19, the attacker may know signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]))). 24. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. So the message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {72}. attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 25. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 4-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 26. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(encM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 27. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 28. By 27, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). 29. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker((bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 30. The attacker initially knows confirmB[]. attacker(confirmB[]). 31. By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function decH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 32. By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function decM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 33. By 32, the attacker may know secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 31, the attacker may know secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 34. By 33, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). By 30, the attacker may know confirmB[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[])). 35. By 34, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). By 29, the attacker may know (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 36. The attacker initially knows receiptTag[]. attacker(receiptTag[]). 37. By 36, the attacker may know receiptTag[]. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 35, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). attacker((receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 38. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. The message (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 37 may be received at input {73}. So event AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))) may be executed at {75}. event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 39. By 38, event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} get directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {82} in copy a_3 event KeyUsed(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {57} in copy a_3 new na_1: bitstring creating na_4 at {58} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26)) with ~M_20 = requestTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = na_4 at {59} in copy a_3 in(net, ((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15),signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18))) with ~M_26 = na_4, signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15) = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),lb_4), signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18) = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),sb_4) at {60} in copy a_3 new rm_1: bitstring creating rm_3 at {65} in copy a_3 new rh_1: bitstring creating rh_3 at {66} in copy a_3 event BeginA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {71} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31,~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_27 = responseTag, ~M_28 = a_4, ~M_29 = encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3), ~M_30 = encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3), ~M_31 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_32 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_33 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {72} in copy a_3 in(net, (receiptTag,a_4,hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))))) with hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {73} in copy a_3 event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {75} in copy a_3 (goal) The event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) is executed at {75} in copy a_3. A trace has been found. RESULT event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. -- Query event(KeyUsed(a_3,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_3,l,s)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 199 rules (92 with conclusion selected). Queue: 28 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 290 rules (102 with conclusion selected). Queue: 51 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 359 rules (102 with conclusion selected). Queue: 108 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 443 rules (102 with conclusion selected). Queue: 91 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 530 rules (102 with conclusion selected). Queue: 18 rules. Starting query event(KeyUsed(a_3,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_3,l,s)) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) goal reachable: b-event(Registered(mallory[],vkL(lm[]),vkS(sm[]))) && b-event(Registered(carol[],vkL(lc[]),vkS(sc[]))) && b-event(Registered(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))) && b-event(Registered(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) -> event(KeyUsed(alice[],vkL(la[]),vkS(sa[]))) RESULT event(KeyUsed(a_3,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_3,l,s)) is true. -- Query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 199 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 32 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 309 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 55 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 378 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 110 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 443 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 112 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 516 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 71 rules. 1200 rules inserted. Base: 533 rules (115 with conclusion selected). Queue: 3 rules. Starting query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] goal reachable: event(SuiteAccepted(protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[])) RESULT event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] is true. -- Query not event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) in process 1. Translating the process into Horn clauses... Completing... 200 rules inserted. Base: 197 rules (88 with conclusion selected). Queue: 28 rules. 400 rules inserted. Base: 295 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 53 rules. 600 rules inserted. Base: 365 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 108 rules. 800 rules inserted. Base: 442 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 99 rules. 1000 rules inserted. Base: 522 rules (98 with conclusion selected). Queue: 44 rules. Starting query not event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) goal reachable: attacker(sid_4) && attacker(nb_3) && attacker(sk) && attacker(sk_1) -> event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] Derivation: Abbreviations: na_3 = na_1[sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rm_2 = rm_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] rh_2 = rh_1[proofS_1 = signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]),proofL_1 = signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),off_1 = (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb_2 = vkS(sb[]),lb_2 = vkL(lb[]),!1 = @sid] 1. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) may be inserted in a table at insert {11}. table(directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[]))). 2. The message (sa[],sb[],sc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {20}. attacker((sa[],sb[],sc[])). 3. By 2, the attacker may know (sa[],sb[],sc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain sb[]. attacker(sb[]). 4. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk_1). 5. By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function pkH the attacker may obtain pkH(sk_1). attacker(pkH(sk_1)). 6. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sk). 7. By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function pkM the attacker may obtain pkM(sk). attacker(pkM(sk)). 8. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(nb_3). 9. We assume as hypothesis that attacker(sid_4). 10. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. So the message (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3) may be sent to the attacker at output {59}. attacker((requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3)). 11. By 10, the attacker may know (requestTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3). Using the function 7-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain na_3. attacker(na_3). 12. The attacker initially knows bob[]. attacker(bob[]). 13. The attacker initially knows carol[]. attacker(carol[]). 14. The attacker initially knows dualPolicy[]. attacker(dualPolicy[]). 15. The attacker initially knows version[]. attacker(version[]). 16. The attacker initially knows protocol[]. attacker(protocol[]). 17. The attacker initially knows offerTag[]. attacker(offerTag[]). 18. By 17, the attacker may know offerTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). Using the function 11-tuple the attacker may obtain (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). attacker((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1))). 19. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 3, the attacker may know sb[]. Using the function signS the attacker may obtain signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). attacker(signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). 20. The message (la[],lb[],lc[]) may be sent to the attacker at output {19}. attacker((la[],lb[],lc[])). 21. By 20, the attacker may know (la[],lb[],lc[]). Using the function 2-proj-3-tuple the attacker may obtain lb[]. attacker(lb[]). 22. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 21, the attacker may know lb[]. Using the function signL the attacker may obtain signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). attacker(signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[])). 23. By 18, the attacker may know (offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)). By 22, the attacker may know signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]). By 19, the attacker may know signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])). attacker(((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[]))). 24. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. So the message (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) may be sent to the attacker at output {72}. attacker((responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 25. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 4-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 26. By 24, the attacker may know (responseTag[],sid_4,encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),signL((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),lc[]),signS((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),sc[]),hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmA[]),(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). Using the function 3-proj-7-tuple the attacker may obtain encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(encM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 27. The attacker initially knows contextTag[]. attacker(contextTag[]). 28. By 27, the attacker may know contextTag[]. By 16, the attacker may know protocol[]. By 15, the attacker may know version[]. By 14, the attacker may know dualPolicy[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 11, the attacker may know na_3. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 8, the attacker may know nb_3. By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). Using the function 13-tuple the attacker may obtain (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). attacker((contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). 29. By 12, the attacker may know bob[]. By 13, the attacker may know carol[]. By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker((bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 30. The attacker initially knows confirmB[]. attacker(confirmB[]). 31. By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 4, the attacker may know sk_1. Using the function decH the attacker may obtain secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). attacker(secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). 32. By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 6, the attacker may know sk. Using the function decM the attacker may obtain secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). attacker(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2)). 33. By 32, the attacker may know secM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 31, the attacker may know secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 26, the attacker may know encM(pkM(sk),rm_2). By 25, the attacker may know encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2). By 7, the attacker may know pkM(sk). By 5, the attacker may know pkH(sk_1). By 28, the attacker may know (contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)). Using the function robust the attacker may obtain robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). attacker(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). 34. By 33, the attacker may know robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). By 30, the attacker may know confirmB[]. Using the function derive the attacker may obtain derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). attacker(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[])). 35. By 34, the attacker may know derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]). By 29, the attacker may know (bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))). Using the function hmac the attacker may obtain hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). attacker(hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 36. The attacker initially knows receiptTag[]. attacker(receiptTag[]). 37. By 36, the attacker may know receiptTag[]. By 9, the attacker may know sid_4. By 35, the attacker may know hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))). Using the function 3-tuple the attacker may obtain (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). attacker((receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))))). 38. The entry directory(bob[],vkL(lb[]),vkS(sb[])) that may be in a table by 1 may be read at get {82}. The message ((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),signL((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),lb[]),signS((offerTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1)),sb[])) that the attacker may have by 23 may be received at input {60}. The message (receiptTag[],sid_4,hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))),confirmB[]),(bob[],carol[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))) that the attacker may have by 37 may be received at input {73}. So event AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)))) may be executed at {75}. event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). 39. By 38, event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). The goal is reached, represented in the following fact: event(AcceptA(carol[],bob[],(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2)),robust(secM(pkM(sk),rm_2),secH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2),pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),(contextTag[],protocol[],version[],dualPolicy[],carol[],bob[],na_3,sid_4,nb_3,pkM(sk),pkH(sk_1),encM(pkM(sk),rm_2),encH(pkH(sk_1),rh_2))))). A more detailed output of the traces is available with set traceDisplay = long. new la: skl creating la_4 at {1} new sa: sks creating sa_4 at {2} new lb: skl creating lb_4 at {3} new sb: sks creating sb_4 at {4} new lc: skl creating lc_1 at {5} new sc: sks creating sc_1 at {6} new lm: skl creating lm_1 at {7} new sm: sks creating sm_1 at {8} insert directory(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {9} event Registered(alice,vkL(la_4),vkS(sa_4)) at {10} insert directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {11} event Registered(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {12} insert directory(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {13} event Registered(carol,vkL(lc_1),vkS(sc_1)) at {14} out(net, (~M,~M_1,~M_2,~M_3,~M_4,~M_5,~M_6,~M_7,~M_8)) with ~M = alice, ~M_1 = vkL(la_4), ~M_2 = vkS(sa_4), ~M_3 = bob, ~M_4 = vkL(lb_4), ~M_5 = vkS(sb_4), ~M_6 = carol, ~M_7 = vkL(lc_1), ~M_8 = vkS(sc_1) at {15} insert directory(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {16} event Registered(mallory,vkL(lm_1),vkS(sm_1)) at {17} out(net, (~M_9,~M_10,~M_11,~M_12,~M_13)) with ~M_9 = mallory, ~M_10 = vkL(lm_1), ~M_11 = vkS(sm_1), ~M_12 = lm_1, ~M_13 = sm_1 at {18} out(net, (~M_14,~M_15,~M_16)) with ~M_14 = la_4, ~M_15 = lb_4, ~M_16 = lc_1 at {19} out(net, (~M_17,~M_18,~M_19)) with ~M_17 = sa_4, ~M_18 = sb_4, ~M_19 = sc_1 at {20} get directory(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {82} in copy a_3 event KeyUsed(bob,vkL(lb_4),vkS(sb_4)) at {57} in copy a_3 new na_1: bitstring creating na_4 at {58} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_20,~M_21,~M_22,~M_23,~M_24,~M_25,~M_26)) with ~M_20 = requestTag, ~M_21 = protocol, ~M_22 = version, ~M_23 = dualPolicy, ~M_24 = carol, ~M_25 = bob, ~M_26 = na_4 at {59} in copy a_3 in(net, ((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15),signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18))) with ~M_26 = na_4, signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_15) = signL((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),lb_4), signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),~M_18) = signS((offerTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7)),sb_4) at {60} in copy a_3 new rm_1: bitstring creating rm_3 at {65} in copy a_3 new rh_1: bitstring creating rh_3 at {66} in copy a_3 event BeginA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {71} in copy a_3 out(net, (~M_27,~M_28,~M_29,~M_30,~M_31,~M_32,~M_33)) with ~M_27 = responseTag, ~M_28 = a_4, ~M_29 = encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3), ~M_30 = encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3), ~M_31 = signL((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),lc_1), ~M_32 = signS((contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),sc_1), ~M_33 = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmA),(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {72} in copy a_3 in(net, (receiptTag,a_4,hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))))) with hmac(derive(robust(decM(~M_29,a_6),decH(~M_30,a_7),~M_29,~M_30,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30)),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,~M_26,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),~M_29,~M_30))) = hmac(derive(robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3))),confirmB),(bob,carol,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {73} in copy a_3 event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) at {75} in copy a_3 (goal) The event AcceptA(carol,bob,(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)),robust(secM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),secH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3),pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),(contextTag,protocol,version,dualPolicy,carol,bob,na_4,a_4,a_5,pkM(a_6),pkH(a_7),encM(pkM(a_6),rm_3),encH(pkH(a_7),rh_3)))) is executed at {75} in copy a_3. A trace has been found. RESULT not event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. -------------------------------------------------------------- Verification summary: Query not attacker(payload[]) is false. Query not (event(SessionKey(k)) && attacker(k)) is false. Query inj-event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. Query inj-event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> inj-event(BeginB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. Query event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) ==> event(AcceptB(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. Query event(KeyUsed(a_3,l,s)) ==> event(Registered(a_3,l,s)) is true. Query event(SuiteAccepted(p_2,v_2,policy_2)) ==> p_2 = protocol[] && v_2 = version[] && policy_2 = dualPolicy[] is true. Query not event(AcceptA(a_3,b_3,t,k)) is false. --------------------------------------------------------------